Montreal REM Construction: Inside the $8.34 Billion Project’s Financial Tracking and Property Impacts
The Montreal Réseau express métropolitain represents one of North America’s most ambitious urban transit projects, but the granular financial tracking systems the user seeks remain largely proprietary. While CDPQ Infra maintained transparency on macro-level budgets and major milestones, detailed operational systems for monthly accruals, invoice management, and tenant displacement calculations were not publicly disclosed. This report synthesizes available information on the project’s financial management, property impacts, and construction tracking systems across the 67-kilometer automated light rail network.
Financial tracking evolved through significant budget pressure
The REM’s budget trajectory reveals how CDPQ Infra managed costs through major disruptions. Starting at $5.5 billion in 2016, the project reached $8.34 billion by November 2024 – a 52% increase that CDPQ Infra absorbed entirely rather than passing to government partners.[1] The cost structure centered on two fixed-price contracts: an Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) contract worth approximately $5 billion awarded to the NouvLR consortium (SNC-Lavalin, Dragados Canada, Aecon Quebec, Pomerleau, and EBC), and a Rolling Stock, Systems, Operation and Maintenance (RSSOM) contract of roughly $1.5 billion to Groupe PMM (Alstom and SNC-Lavalin O&M).[2]
Budget increases broke down into specific categories that CDPQ Infra tracked and reported publicly. COVID-19 and global disruptions accounted for $800 million (50% of increases), covering supply chain problems, price escalations, worksite closures, and border restrictions affecting skilled labor. The Mount Royal Tunnel presented unexpected challenges worth $350 million, including the discovery of century-old dynamite requiring remote-controlled drilling (60,000 boreholes total) and severe deterioration under McGill College Avenue where decades of de-icing salt corroded structural elements.[3] Community improvements added $150 million, work optimization with third parties $350 million, and schedule extensions to 2025 cost $392 million.
The financing structure distributed risk uniquely. CDPQ Infra invested $3.2-3.33 billion (approximately 50%) from pension fund assets, targeting an 8% return over 99 years while bearing construction, operational, and ridership risks. Quebec and federal governments each contributed $1.283 billion, with Quebec receiving preferred shares yielding 3.7% after CDPQ reached its priority return.[4] Hydro-Québec added $295 million for electrification equipment.[5] The revenue model charges ARTM (regional transit authority) $0.72 per passenger-kilometer, indexed to inflation, covering both operating and capital costs – a structure differing from traditional transit where governments fund capital separately from fare-supported operations.[2]
Monthly cost tracking remains proprietary despite institutional oversight
CDPQ Infra’s monthly cost tracking and accrual methods remain undisclosed in public documentation. As a subsidiary of a AAA-rated pension fund manager overseeing $473 billion in assets, CDPQ maintains sophisticated financial controls, but specific operational systems for REM construction were not detailed publicly.[6] This level of granularity – monthly accruals, invoice processing workflows, payment approval hierarchies – falls under commercial confidentiality with contractors and proprietary project management systems.
What can be inferred from the institutional structure suggests milestone-based payments typical of fixed-price EPC contracts. The NouvLR and Groupe PMM consortia likely submitted progress claims based on work completed, verified by CDPQ Infra’s dedicated project office with financial controls, and consolidated into CDPQ’s broader enterprise systems. Independent oversight included external auditors monitoring procurement, an independent committee with a former Supreme Court Justice confirming process integrity, and Sener serving as Independent Checker Engineer.[7]
The fixed-price contract structure transferred substantial risk to experienced consortia. Rather than cost-plus arrangements requiring detailed tracking of every expense, these contracts established total prices with contractors absorbing overruns within their scope. This approach, while protecting CDPQ Infra from certain risks, means detailed cost breakdowns beyond major categories (civil works, stations, systems, rolling stock) weren’t publicly necessary or available.
Budget categories reflected infrastructure complexity across five segments
Major budget categories aligned with the project’s physical components across 67 kilometers. Track infrastructure included double tracks with 3.5 kilometers of tunnel, while 26 new accessible stations featured universal access, climate control, and platform screen doors at an undisclosed per-station cost. Rolling stock represented a defined line item: 212 Alstom Metropolis cars forming 106 trainsets, operating in 4-car configurations during peak hours (780 passengers) and 2-car off-peak for energy efficiency.[2]
Support facilities comprised centralized control stations, maintenance and storage facilities at Saint-Eustache, administrative offices, telecommunications infrastructure, electrical substations, and 11 park-and-ride locations. Systems costs covered Urbalis 400 automated train control, platform screen doors throughout the network, Wi-Fi connectivity, HVAC systems, and comprehensive accessibility features.[5] At $125 million per kilometer, REM positioned itself well below typical North American light rail costs exceeding $1 billion per kilometer.[8]
The elevated structure segment demonstrated cost efficiency through innovative construction. Two 110-meter, 580-ton launching gantries named “Anne” and “Marie” assembled 4,102 prefabricated concrete segments (42.3-57.7 tons each) manufactured at Béton préfabriquée du Lac’s Saint-Eugène-de-Grantham plant.[9] This approach completed spans in two days versus three weeks for traditional methods, with 366 columns spaced every 30-40 meters supporting 14.5 kilometers of primarily West Island elevated guideway.[10]
Tunneling represented distinct budget elements. The 3.6-kilometer airport tunnel utilized “Alice,” a custom Robbins Earth Pressure Balance TBM spanning 155 meters as a mobile factory with a 10-person crew. Nearly two years of drilling through soft soil, wetlands, and beneath airport runways installed 1,800 rings comprising 12,600 segments.[2] The Mount Royal Tunnel rehabilitation required 92 meters of complete vault replacement and 290 meters of major rehabilitation using an innovative Sequential Demolition Method developed by Hatch, plus 5.2 kilometers of central wall reconstruction and 10 kilometers of track upgrades – all while managing explosive residue from 1918 construction.[3][11]
Property expropriations affected dozens of owners with limited compensation transparency
Property impacts extended across Montreal, though specific compensation amounts remained largely confidential under privacy laws. In 2016, 70 land plots were placed on reserve affecting 45 property owners, with approximately 90% (63 properties) facing expropriation. By 2017, access to information requests revealed approximately 200 lots potentially included in proceedings, with ownership transfers scheduled for July 2018 and July 2019.[12]
Documented cases illustrate the human impact. Sylvie Gagnon faced expropriation of her Griffintown property, a house built by her grandfather that she inherited in 2014, with the train potentially “built right through” the multi-generational family home.[13] CF Pointe-Claire shopping centre, owned by Cadillac Fairview, entered legal expropriation proceedings in 2021 involving the shopping center and adjacent sites dedicated to multi-billion-dollar real estate development, represented by Fasken law firm.[14]
The heritage Rodier Building on Notre-Dame Street, built in 1875 by Charles Séraphin Rodier Jr. and listed by Heritage Montreal as an endangered emblematic site, faced potential partial demolition according to CDPQ Infra’s environmental assessment.[15] Eight Brossard property owners lost land for the terminal Rive-Sud station at Highways 10 and 30, including six private enterprises (several agricultural) and two public entities (City of Brossard, Hydro-Québec), though all properties were vacant with no building operations affected.[16]
The legal framework accelerated expropriations through Act respecting the Réseau électrique métropolitain (Bill 137, 2017), which legal experts criticized for making contesting decisions “very difficult” and “worrying” compared to standard Quebec expropriation procedures.[17] Property owners received “just and prior indemnity” under Quebec Charter standards – market value plus compensation for injury – but could only accept negotiated offers or ask courts to decide, with limited appeal rights.[18] The 4-year reserve period prevented owners from undertaking work except minor repairs, and owners had just 15 days after expropriation notice to appear before the Tribunal.[12]
Underground construction beneath buildings required unprecedented monitoring
Underground work affected multiple downtown locations with comprehensive structural monitoring to prevent damage. The Mount Royal Tunnel rehabilitation through 5 kilometers of downtown presented the most complex challenge. In July 2020, drill tips ignited century-old explosives left from 1912 construction, suspending work and mandating remote-controlled drilling equipment for the remaining 60,000 boreholes.[3][11] More critically, severe deterioration of the tunnel’s double arch under McGill College Avenue – where decades of de-icing salt infiltration without waterproofing corroded steel columns and beams – required over 100 meters of structural work.[11]
The McGill College Avenue section, positioned between multi-level Eaton Centre and Place Montreal Trust shopping complexes, became one of the most difficult construction sites. Cut-and-cover excavation descended 15 meters from street to tunnel top and 30 meters to track level, installing pipe arch canopy shores while maintaining street access. Three construction crew shifts worked continuously, yet ConstructConnect reported in November 2021 that despite site complexity and proximity to major buildings, only one minor municipal pipe leak occurred with no reported structural issues to adjacent buildings.[10]
McGill Station construction using the New Austrian Tunneling Method (NATM) positioned the station approximately 15 meters below grade between two major high-rise buildings.[19] Engineers maintained an existing underground commercial passageway connecting buildings during construction, employed drill and blast techniques in rock, and managed first 15 meters of backfill from previous underground works before reaching TĂ©trauville formation limestone. Comprehensive instrumentation and monitoring programs protected neighboring structures from vibration and settlement, with site limits literally at the edge of adjacent buildings while coordinating with existing metro tunnel proximity and maintaining traffic at the intersection.[19]
Édouard-Montpetit Station descended 70 meters – equivalent to a 20-story building – making it the second-deepest station in North America after Washington Park, Portland (79 meters).[19][20] Controlled blasting through hard bedrock in a densely built sector required precise monitoring, positioned adjacent to the metro blue line at 12 meters depth with the Mount Royal tunnel nearby at 70 meters. Excavation proceeded through fall 2019 with the station opening in 2022.[11]
The airport tunnel, while less constrained by adjacent buildings, navigated delicate environmental conditions. TBM “Alice” drilled 2.5 kilometers underground through soft soil, wetlands, and beneath active airport runways at 30+ meters depth, excavating over 300,000 tons of material across nearly two years (2020-2022).[2] This approach avoided disrupting natural ecology and airport infrastructure while requiring liquid nitrogen injection for cutting head maintenance and careful water level management.[10]
Tenant displacement details remain undocumented despite legal requirements
Specific tenant relocation data from REM expropriations remains largely absent from public records, despite legal frameworks requiring notification. When expropriation orders issued, property owners had 15 days to declare names and addresses of all tenants, who could then appear before the Tribunal claiming damages. Leases signed by occupying tenants ended upon expropriation, though expropriated persons retained enjoyment until compensated, with public entities taking possession within one month after compensation payment.[12]
No systematic documentation of tenant counts, relocation assistance, or rent loss calculations for REM-affected properties appeared in available sources. As comparison context, the separate Turcot Interchange project’s expropriation of a 780 Saint-Rémi Street warehouse in Griffintown affected 107 units, with tenants receiving $5,000-$15,000 while many paid double rent in new locations. That project took 12 years from announcement to new housing, with a $24.5 million affordable housing development (103 units over 13 stories) funded partly by $13.5 million from Transports Québec, prioritizing displaced residents.[13]
The absence of public tenant displacement data for REM likely reflects several factors: many expropriated properties were vacant land for station construction rather than occupied buildings; legal settlements often include confidentiality agreements; and no centralized database of tenant impacts exists in accessible government registries. The transportation dues/tax system implemented May 1, 2018, created indirect ongoing impacts – charging $107.64 per square meter (approximately $10 per square foot) on construction work exceeding $750,000 within 1 kilometer of most stations (500 meters for downtown stations), targeting $600 million over 50 years.[21]
Construction management divided work across five geographic segments
The 67-kilometer network divided into distinct segments with separate timelines. The South Shore branch opened July 31, 2023 – the only operational segment – covering 17 kilometers with five stations (Brossard, Du Quartier, Panama, Île-des-Sœurs, Central Station) including the Samuel De Champlain Bridge crossing. This segment underwent construction from 2018-2023, testing in 2022-2023, and serves over 20,000 daily riders initially.[2][22]
The central Montreal segment through the Mount Royal Tunnel targets November 2025 opening after construction spanning 2018-2024 and testing beginning April 2025. This 5-kilometer tunnel section includes three underground stations – Central Station, McGill (NATM construction), and Édouard-Montpetit (70-meter shaft) – connecting three metro lines. Major construction completed in 2024 with dynamic testing at commercial speeds underway through 2025.[2][9]
The Deux-Montagnes branch (North Shore) converts existing commuter rail infrastructure, targeting November 2025 commissioning after construction from 2018-2025.[2][9] The Deux-Montagnes line closed January 2020 to early 2022 for conversion, with dynamic testing between Saint-Eustache maintenance center and Sainte-Dorothée ongoing as of 2024.[23] Multiple stations including Canora, Mont-Royal, and Sunnybrooke will connect the segment to Deux-Montagnes terminus.
The West Island Anse-à -l’Orme branch features the project’s signature 14.5-kilometer elevated structure, with launching gantries completing structural work 2019-2022. Six stations (Sunnybrooke, Pierrefonds-Roxboro, Des Sources, Fairview-Pointe-Claire, Kirkland, Anse-à -l’Orme) underwent finishing work through 2023-2024, with dynamic testing beginning August 2024 at Pierrefonds-Roxboro and Sunnybrooke. Originally targeted for Q4 2024, opening slipped to November 2025 or potentially Q2 2026, with 9.3 kilometers of rail installed in 2022 alone and catenary systems following 2022-2023.[2]
The Airport branch remains under construction targeting Q1 2027, comprising approximately 8 kilometers including the 3.6-kilometer TBM tunnel and 840 meters elevated. Two stations – Marie-Curie and YUL-Aéroport-Montréal-Trudeau – are completing construction with catenary installation and electrical wiring in tunnels progressing through 2024-2026 before 2027 commissioning.[2]
Contractor responsibilities aligned with specialized capabilities
The NouvLR consortium managed all infrastructure under the EPC contract, with SNC-Lavalin Major Projects leading overall project management and engineering, Dragados Canada handling construction expertise and elevated structures, Groupe Aecon Quebec (24% ownership share) managing infrastructure construction and civil works, Pomerleau providing construction operations and local expertise, and EBC contributing civil engineering works.[2] AECOM served as Engineer of Record for tunnel design (both Mount Royal rehabilitation and airport TBM), bridge and elevated structures, stations, railway infrastructure (tracks, power, traction), and road improvements.[5]
Architecture firms collaborated on station design: Lemay led architecture, Bisson Fortin contributed station architecture, Perkins + Will developed architectural design and the modular station concept, and Provencher Roy provided additional architectural services.[11] This created a unified design language across 26 stations while allowing customization for specific sites.
Groupe PMM handled all rolling stock, systems, and long-term operations. Alstom Transport Canada led rolling stock delivery (212 Metropolis cars forming 106 two-car trains), the Urbalis 400 automated train control system, Iconis control center, platform screen doors at all stations, and depot equipment. SNC-Lavalin O&M secured the 30-year operations and maintenance contract, now operating through GPMMOM (the operational entity).[5]
Specialized contractors contributed critical capabilities. Robbins of Cleveland, Ohio, custom-built the 155-meter Earth Pressure Balance TBM “Alice” for airport tunneling.[2][10] Hatch, working with CIMA/CCH joint venture, designed and supervised Mount Royal Tunnel rehabilitation, developing the innovative Sequential Demolition Method that won TAC Canada Project of the Year Award 2023 and ITA Project of the Year 2023, completing the southern section 102 days ahead of schedule. DEAL, a subsidiary of Italy’s Rizzani de Eccher, supplied two 110-meter, 580-ton launching gantries with 600-megaton capacity each. Béton préfabriquée du Lac manufactured 4,102 precast concrete segments at their Saint-Eugène-de-Grantham plant with 200 dedicated employees.
Reporting structures emphasized financial transparency over operational detail
CDPQ Infra provided periodic project updates through press releases announcing milestones, commissioning dates, and cost adjustments rather than formal monthly reports. The most recent November 2024 update reported net cost at $8.34 billion, up 4.9% from the previous year.[8] Financial updates appeared approximately annually or when significant changes occurred, with budget evolution tracked publicly from $5.5 billion (2016-2018) to $6.3 billion baseline to the current $8.34 billion.
Key performance indicators focused on macro-level metrics accessible to stakeholders and media. Financial KPIs included total project cost, cost per kilometer ($125 million, positioned “well below best comparable projects in North America”), budget variance with specific attribution ($800M pandemic, $350M Mount Royal Tunnel, $392M schedule extensions), and return targets (8-9% for CDPQ Infra, 3.7% for Quebec).[8] Schedule KPIs tracked commissioning dates by branch, construction timeline milestones, testing phases, and service interruption frequency during operations.
Environmental KPIs received substantial attention: 2.5 million tonnes CO2 equivalent reduction over 25 years, 100,000 tonnes annually (equivalent to 30,000 fewer cars), 250,000 trees planted by end 2025, 147,000 tonnes material recycling (exceeding targets), 45 hectares farmland compensation through agricultural land trust ($2.9M), and 2.8 hectares wetlands created with KahnawĂ :ke Mohawk community.[5][9]
Oversight reporting flowed to multiple government entities. The Autorité régionale de transport métropolitain (ARTM) received regular updates through an operational committee meeting since September 2019, reviewing project compatibility with regional transit strategy and approving fare integration.[9] ARTM pays CDPQ Infra $0.72 per passenger-kilometer traveled (inflation-adjusted).[2] The Bureau d’audiences publiques sur l’environnement (BAPE) conducted environmental impact hearings in fall 2016, issuing a critical January 2017 report stating it was “premature to authorize” the project due to insufficient information on financial models, environmental impacts, and ridership effects – criticism the provincial government proceeded despite.
Provincial reporting connected to Quebec’s Ministry of Transportation and Sustainable Mobility, with agreements determining responsibilities and governance structures. The federal Canada Infrastructure Bank invested $1.28 billion via 15-year senior secured loan (1% escalating to 3%), requiring compliance reporting to Infrastructure Canada.[5] CDPQ Infra’s Board of Directors, chaired by CDPQ CEO (Charles Emond, later Emmanuel Jaclot), included external experts in transportation like Jeremy Long (MTR Corporation background) and Jean-Marc Charoud (RATP experience), reporting annually to parent organization CDPQ.
Master construction spreadsheets and invoice systems remain confidential
The detailed construction tracking systems the user seeks – master budget spreadsheets with line-item costs, monthly accrual methodologies, invoice approval workflows, change order logs, and payment tracking databases – were not publicly disclosed and likely remain proprietary to CDPQ Infra and its contractors. This represents standard practice for large infrastructure projects where such operational details fall under commercial confidentiality.
Several factors explain the limited public availability. Fixed-price EPC and RSSOM contracts meant milestone-based payments rather than detailed cost reimbursement tracking. CDPQ Infra bore cost overruns rather than government partners, reducing public accountability requirements for granular expenditure tracking. Commercial confidentiality clauses with NouvLR and Groupe PMM consortia protected proprietary pricing and cost structures. Current Quebec transparency requirements don’t mandate disclosure of internal project management systems for CDPQ Infra, which maintains legal, operational, and financial independence from government despite public pension fund ownership.
Transparency criticisms emerged during the project. BAPE’s 2017 report criticized CDPQ Infra for “failing to provide crucial information” on financial models and impacts. For the cancelled REM de l’Est, ARTM issued an 84-page critical report in 2022, and STM (Montreal’s transit authority) claimed notification only one day before public announcement. Some stakeholders noted financial incentives potentially conflicted with optimal transit network design, given CDPQ Infra’s profit requirements.
What remained publicly available included: semi-annual or annual budget totals with major variance explanations, commissioning timeline updates by branch, major milestone announcements, environmental compensation program details, employment figures (peak 2,000 direct jobs at NouvLR, 34,000 total including supply chain), and approximately 65% Quebec company participation.[9] Testing metrics occasionally appeared in updates – hours of rolling stock testing, automation test completions, reliability improvements (breakdowns reduced to one-third of previous year by 2024).
The contrast between macro transparency and operational opacity reflects CDPQ Infra’s unique governance model. As a pension fund subsidiary rather than traditional government transit agency, it prioritized execution speed and financial returns over exhaustive public reporting. AAA credit ratings from DBRS, S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch suggest robust internal financial controls, but these systems serve institutional investors rather than public transparency objectives.
Construction impacts balanced infrastructure progress with community concerns
Property damage documentation remained limited despite extensive tunneling and vibration concerns. Pre-construction building and infrastructure inspections occurred in construction zones, with ambient vibration measurements in sensitive areas. NouvLR consortium required compliance with vibration thresholds ensuring structural integrity, government noise criteria, and particulate standards (120 µg/m³ total particles over 24 hours, 30 µg/m³ PM2.5). Comprehensive instrumentation programs monitored sensitive sites like McGill Station and McGill College Avenue excavations.[11]
Despite these precautions, community disputes emerged. St. Laurent borough faced significant tree loss – over 30,000 public and private trees cut versus 14,000 expected (54,000 m²). CDPQ Infra proposed planting only 960 trees (10,000 m²) as compensation, prompting an August 2023 borough resolution calling for promise fulfillment. With all five REM stations in St. Laurent located in the borough, officials emphasized sustainable development, biodiversity protection, and Climate Emergency Plan commitments (55% GHG reduction by 2030 target).
No publicized lawsuits or major damage claims from adjacent property owners appeared in available sources, suggesting monitoring programs effectively prevented structural damage. The McGill College Avenue work, despite requiring extensive excavation adjacent to major shopping complexes and beneath a busy street, reported only a single leaky municipal pipe rather than building damage.[10] General construction impacts – 20-hour daily construction schedules in some areas, dust requiring mitigation measures, and noise from drilling and blasting – affected communities but without documented legal claims in accessible records.
Delays and cost overruns tested project management. Originally targeting December 2020 completion, the project revised to Spring/Summer 2022, then Spring 2023, with actual South Shore opening July 31, 2023, and full network completion now 2027.[2][13][24] The July 2020 explosion from century-old dynamite in Mount Royal Tunnel, McGill College Avenue deterioration discovery, COVID-19 pandemic, labor shortages, and material supply issues all contributed.[3][24] CDPQ Infra assumed responsibility for cost overruns under its financial model, protecting government partners from budget increases but absorbing $2.34 billion in additional costs between the $6.3 billion baseline and $8.34 billion final budget.[8]
Conclusions reveal institutional strengths and information gaps
This investigation reveals a sophisticated institutional investor-led infrastructure model with clear macro-level financial reporting but limited public access to operational tracking systems. CDPQ Infra’s approach prioritized execution speed and financial returns appropriate to a pension fund investor, accepting transparency trade-offs that would be unacceptable for traditional government transit agencies.
Available information includes: Budget evolution with attributed variance categories, fixed-price contract structure and consortium members, major milestone timelines by geographic segment, environmental KPI targets and achievements, property expropriation legal framework and some documented cases, underground construction locations and methods, contractor responsibilities across work packages, oversight reporting to government entities and ARTM, and cost per kilometer benchmarking against North American peers.
Unavailable or limited information encompasses: Monthly cost accrual methodologies and accounting procedures, invoice processing and payment tracking systems, detailed budget line items beyond major categories (what specific percentages went to stations vs. track vs. systems), master construction spreadsheet formats and cost control tools, change order logs with quantities and approval processes, tenant displacement counts and relocation assistance details, rent loss calculation methodologies for affected properties, specific property compensation amounts paid to individual owners, real-time construction dashboard systems, and safety metrics like injury rates or TRIR (Total Recordable Incident Rate).
The project’s unique governance created both advantages and challenges. CDPQ Infra’s financial capacity enabled rapid decision-making and construction advancement without traditional government procurement delays.[25] The pension fund absorbed $2.34 billion in cost overruns protecting public budgets, while fixed-price contracts transferred construction risk to experienced international consortia.[26] However, this model created coordination tensions with ARTM and municipal transit agencies, limited public accountability compared to government-owned projects, and prioritized CDPQ Infra’s financial returns over some regional transit optimization opportunities.
For researchers seeking granular operational data – the detailed spreadsheets, monthly accrual journals, invoice approval workflows, and tenant impact calculations – these likely exist within CDPQ Infra’s project management systems but remain proprietary under commercial confidentiality and institutional practice. Those requiring such information would need direct engagement with CDPQ Infra, potentially through freedom of information requests (though exceptions for commercial confidentiality would likely apply), research partnerships, or professional relationships with project participants.
References
[1] RenewCanada. “REM Budget and Project Updates.” Available at: https://www.renewcanada.net/
[2] Wikipedia. “Réseau express métropolitain.” Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Réseau_express_métropolitain
[3] Railway Age. “Montreal’s Mount Royal Tunnel Rehabilitation.” Available at: https://www.railwayage.com/
[4] CDPQ Infra - Wikipedia. “Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec Infrastructure.” Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CDPQ_Infra
[5] Railway Technology. “Montreal REM Light Rail Project.” Available at: https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/montreal-rem-light-rail-project/
[6] Blogger (CDPQ Reports). “CDPQ Financial Reports and Asset Management.” Available at: https://www.cdpq.com/
[7] Newswire.ca (CNW Group). “CDPQ Infra Project Updates and Announcements.” Available at: https://www.newswire.ca/
[8] Newswire.ca (CNW Group). “REM Cost and Budget Updates - November 2024.” Available at: https://www.newswire.ca/
[9] CDPQ Infra. “Official REM Project Website.” Available at: https://rem.info/en
[10] ConstructConnect. “REM Construction Progress and Technical Details.” Available at: https://canada.constructconnect.com/
[11] Réseau express métropolitain (REM Official). “REM Construction and Engineering Updates.” Available at: https://rem.info/en
[12] Dgchait (Quebec Legal Information). “REM Expropriation Procedures and Legal Framework.” Available at: http://dgchait.qc.ca/
[13] CBC News. “Montreal REM Property Impacts and Community Stories.” Available at: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal
[14] Fasken Law Firm. “CF Pointe-Claire REM Expropriation Case.” Available at: https://www.fasken.com/
[15] CBC News. “Rodier Building Heritage Concerns - Montreal REM.” Available at: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal
[16] TVRS (Télévision Rive-Sud). “Brossard Property Expropriations for REM.” Available at: https://www.tvrs.ca/
[17] CTV News Montreal. “REM Bill 137 Legal Concerns and Expropriation Process.” Available at: https://montreal.ctvnews.ca/
[18] Schneider Legal (Quebec Real Estate Law). “Quebec Expropriation Law and Just Indemnity.” Available at: https://schneiderlegal.com/
[19] Tunnelingonline. “McGill and Édouard-Montpetit Station Construction - NATM Method.” Available at: https://www.tunnelingonline.com/
[20] Gouvernement du Québec. “REM Infrastructure and Station Information.” Available at: https://www.transports.gouv.qc.ca/
[21] DWPV (Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg). “REM Transportation Dues and Tax Framework.” Available at: https://www.dwpv.com/
[22] La Caisse (CDPQ). “REM South Shore Opening and Ridership.” Available at: https://www.lacaisse.com/
[23] CPTDB Wiki (Canadian Public Transit Discussion Board). “REM Deux-Montagnes Branch Conversion.” Available at: https://cptdb.ca/wiki/
[24] Railway Age. “REM Construction Delays and Cost Overruns Analysis.” Available at: https://www.railwayage.com/
[25] TransitCenter. “P3 Infrastructure Models and Transit Governance.” Available at: https://transitcenter.org/
[26] The Globe and Mail. “CDPQ REM Financial Model and Risk Management.” Available at: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/